Explosive Remnants of War: The Negotiations Continue

They Started With A
Temple:JAHDS in Thailand
JAH=aS
The Japanese Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS),

better known for its research and development of Ground Penetrating

Radar (Mine Eye), recently became involved in mine clearance. In the

process of testing mine clearance equipment, JAHDS cleared an area

by Paddy Blagden, Former
T,rltnirnl n;rector f t:lrHD
JAHDS is better known for research
and development of Mine Eye and for
supporting the demining efforts of other
organizations, rather than for mine
clearance. The need to test Mine Eye under
operational co ndi tions call ed for the
creation of a test field with access to
live mines. It follows that if you have a
field with live mines, you might as well
clear them.
The decision to step into the mine
clearance arena was not taken ligh tly.
JAHDS had been resting equipm ent in
T hailand for so me rime, with rhe full
co-operation of the T hailand Mine Action
Centre (TMAC). It had also formed a
working relationship with the General
Chanichai C hoo nhavan Foundation
(GCCF), a Thai NGO based in Bangkok,
and the Thai Army, which had a Humanitarian Mine Act ion U nit (HMAU)
working in the n ort h east o f t he
country. JAHDS appointed Mr.
Miss Thailand
Wataru Sugaya, an ex-master-mariner, as
competitors visiting the project manager. JAHDS also needed
demining site. C/0 an 1nternat10na
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field operational skills. They chose a South
Africa n , Johan Van Zyl , to be th e
Operations Manager. Zyl is a man of
vast ex perience wh o is well known
in th e mine clearance world. They
were ready to begin.
Obviously, you canno t st art
demining without a minefield. The project
chosen was the area around the ancient
Khmer temple ofSadok Kok T horn, close
to the Thai-Cambodia border, north of
the small border town of Aranyaprathet
in Sakaeo Province. This temple is one
of a network of Khmer temples, built
about 1100 years ago, with the famo us
Cambodian temple complex of Angkor
War as irs centre. The Khmer Rouge, and
other warring factions, may have mined
the remple grounds as pan of the border
minefields. Clearance of the tem pie itself
was needed to permit the promotion of
increased tourism in the area and to
provide access to land for local farming.
The site was relatively small--about
340 ,000 sq uare metres in all--but
presented a range of problems, with
vegetation varying from a flat grassy area
to densely vegetated sections with large
trees. The area was seen as a good site to
build up experience. Thus,JAHDS started
with a temple.
Starting from nothing is difficult and
demands patience, determination and
good planning. T he JAHDS ream started
by setting up a working partnership wirh
HMAU 1 and began the refresher training
of rhe GCCF deminers. The area chosen
was perfect for such rraining~a low-th reat
area, with medium vegetation, but well
suited to a systems approach, using
machines, manual clearance and dogs.
As confidence and experience increased,
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more GCCF deminers were recruited, and
HMAU 1 was able to loan a BDM48
brush cutter and dog teams, and to carry
out some of rhe Quality Assurance. They
also allowed JAHDS to use a Tempest Mk
4 an d a Pearson SDTT (Surv ivable
Demining Tractor and Tools), a highly
versatile and effective machine. A JAHDSowned Hitachi brush cutter augmented
rhese machines.
Thanks to the help of its working
partners, the JAHDS programme is now
going well, and the first sections of land
have been formally handed back to the
D istr ict, and a re eve n no w being
cultivated. T he work being done will be
available for inspection by those attending the Fifth Meeting of States Parties
to the Mine Ban Treaty. It appears
JAHDS will meet irs target completion
date of October 2003. Life has always been
"interesting" (remember the Chinese
curse?) and never d ull. T he site was even
visited by beautiful contestants for rhe
"Miss T hai land" competition. No group
of deminers has eve r conce ntrated
qu ite so hard.
For the futu re, there are other
challenges in the border area, and even
over rh e bo rd er in Cambodia, but
JAHDS will never forget that they started
with a temple. I
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Explosive Remnants of
War: The Negotiations Continue
From 16- 27 June 2003, States Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons 1 (CCW) met in a Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) to discuss a draft proposal for an Instrument on
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). 2 A previous article in the Journal
of Mine Action3 outlined the background to this process, and the June
meeting was the second to take place in 2003. This article explains
what was discussed in June, what will happen next and some of the
broader issues of interest to the mine action community.

by Paul Ellis, GICHD

Background
The aim of the current series of
meetings is to d iscuss possible measures
that co uld alleviate the hu manitarian
impact of ERW. Based on earlier work,
the ambassador from the Netherlands,
who is responsible for coordinating work
on ERW in the CCW, presented a paper
as a possible basis for an instrument or
protocol on ERW. At present, there are
two arguments as to how work on this
paper should progress. The majority of
Stares Parties favour the adoption of a
legally binding protocol. 4 However, some
States Parties continue to oppose this
view, favouring a "statement of best
practices." For the clearance community,
the enco uraging news is that issues that
are central to their work in the field (such
as responsibility for clearing up ERW and
mea sures to pro tect civilians, e.g .,
fencing and marking) are being d iscussed
in an international forum. These
discussions may result in formal obligations
for parries to future conflicts to provide
clearance and other mine action activities.
After two weeks of discussions, the
Coordinator for ERW will now redraft
the proposal and present it again to
States Parties in the autumn with the
next form al meeting sch edul ed for
November 2003. The key articles of interest
to the clearance community are Article 3:
C learance, Removal and D estruction of
Explosive Remnams of War; Article 4:
Recording and Use of Informatio n ;

Article 5: Provisions for rhe Protection of
the C ivilian Populations from the Effects
of Explosive Remnams ofWar; Article 7:
Existing Explosive Remnants of War;
and the Technical Annex, which covers
recording and provision of information
on UXO and abandoned ordnance,
pl us risk education and the provision
of information. 5

he Draft for an
nstrument on ERW
From a positive perspective, the draft
paper offers the prospect of recognizing
the responsibility of parties to a conflict
to clean up ERW, which could mean
better funding provision, swifter action
to d ea l with ERW and improved cooperation between military fo rces
and h umanitarian organisation s. Also,
information would be made available,
such as the types of o rdnance used,
location of battle areas, meth ods for
safe disposal, presence of ami-handling
devices, and location and amounts of
abandoned ammu niti o n. All thi s
information would be of considerable use
for pre-deplo ym ent planni n g and
preparation for a pose-conflict environment. However, rhe proposals could see
sta tes increasingly usi ng their own
assets (almost certainly the military)
to undertake work previously done by
the clearance co mmunity. This raises
issues about the quality and efficacy
of the military in this type of work.
Furthermore, if states use their own assets
to clear ERW or provide risk education,
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they might have to pay a third parry to
do what they see as a duplication ofwork.
As a result, there could potentially be a
negative impact on funding.
Before there will be any agreement,
there are a number of obstacles that we
nee d to overcome. Firs t , among
many delegatio ns, there is still a lack
of und ersta ndin g about the reality of
work in the field o r what is invol ve d
in providing risk ed ucation. T he few
"experts" that states bring along are
almost always military officers, an d
not always with experience in explosive
ordnance disp osal (EOD), let alone a
mine action programme. Several states
are openly opposed to providing any
information beyond the bare minimum.
The usual reason cited for this is national
security. The GICHD and others have
pointed out that the issue is not one of
providing the information bur rather of
when the information becomes known.
A good example would be, should states
refuse to provide coordinates for cluster
bomb strikes, it just means that the
clearance comm unity would have to
establish the location us ing a survey.
The information ultimately becomes
known~ir just rakes longer and costs
more. There are also grounds for concern
about how information would be provided.
The draft proposal mentioned international
databases, perhaps run by the Un ited

Discussions include
the provision of
information on the
location and types of
abandoned ordnance.

Logistics-Explosives-safety
we will be concentrating on in the second
half of the yea r include seekin g to
underline the importance of providing
information that is as broad and detailed
as possible, giv ing examples from the
field to explain the reali ty ofclearance and
risk education work, and explaining the
strengths of the clearance community.

(;onclusion

Locating dangerous
areas would become
easier should States
agree to provide
details of battle areas.

Nations, yet such databases do not exist.
In pan, the problem for man y states
appears to be a reluctance to provide
information, perhaps because they perceive
this as a loss of control.

n.e GICHD's Role
The GICHD will continue to play
an active role in n ego tiations . Two
recently publis hed reports o n inform a tion requ irement s and warnings
and risk education6 were written to try
to provide delega t es to the m ee tings
with a better understanding of the
issues involved . The Centre's mandate
is to provide technical advice to the States
Parties involved in the discussions. Areas

T he nex t meeting of the GGE o n
ERW is 17- 24 November 2003. Shortly
after, there will be a meeting of States
Parries to the CCW, on 27-28 November,
ro consider the next step on this issue.
While it is uncl ear what the States
Parties will d ecid e, there a re two
probable outcomes: an ag reemen t to
create a legally binding protocol or a
non-legally binding "statement of bes t
practice" for E RW Discussions on ERW
continue, possibly because the States
Parties cannot decide on the legal status
of the proposal or due to the demands
in any paper being unacceptable to some
States Parties. Perhaps the great es t
danger is a lega lly binding docu ment
that has been so weakened to achieve
agreemen t that it does li t tl e if anything to allevia te the acknowledged
hum a nita ri an impact of E RW. •
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ITEP Work Plan, continued from page 97

Service (UNMAS) and Geneva International
Centre for Humanita ri an D em ining
(GICHD). IT E P participants are
enco uraged to reach out into the user
co mmunity to seek fe edb ac k on the
ITEP Work Plan and, together with
other stakeholders, to identify user needs
in order to update and adapt the T&E
projects accordingly. The ITEP Work
Plan is available through the ITE P
website ( http: //www.irep.ws/) . Irs
distributio n is also being facilitated
by UNMAS and GICHD .

TTEP recogn ises the fact that a
considerable amo unt ofT&E has been
and i s being co nducted by many
other orga nizati o n s in rhe fiel d of
humanit ari an demining . The hopes
a nd ex p ectations are that members of
the demining community will consult the
Work Plan, identify re le va nt T &E
activities, reque sr more information
and possibly actively collaborate in them. •

*ALl graphics courtesy ofthe author.
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logistics-Explosives-Safety
Cost, safety, and compliance with international regulations are among
the most important factors with respect to shipping explosives. The
following article gives detailed insight into the transport and storage of
explosives necessary for destroying mines and UXO.

by Rolf Oechslin, RUAG
Munition and Jorgen
Schneider, Dyno Nobel
Donmark A/S
Introduction
The humanitarian disaster caused by
landmines and UXO littered throughout
more than GO co untries has created an
active and growing response from the
internatio na l co mmunity that could
evemually lead to the elimination of the
use of landmines. As mines can be very
dangerous or impossible to render safe,
they often must be destroyed in-situ.
Quality demolition products are essential
for the safety of the mine clearance experrs.
Delivering materials for the dernining
teams ca n be solved with reasonable
economic resources and within a relatively
short time; however, problems associated
with exp losives mu st be so lved first.
For example:
• Can explos ives s uitab le for
demining be delivered locally?
• Can explosives be transported ro
the site and stored safely?
• Is it possible to get explosives from
neighbouring countries?
Compatibility

• Can explosives be delivered from
other countries?
• W hat type of explosives should be
delivered?
Many traditional safety precautions
and procedures for destroying mines and
UXO are still being used. The fo llowing
section includes a short discussion of the
difficulties of rranspo rring explosives and
a proposal for simplifying procedures for
destroying or rendering safe mines and
UXO that can easily be delivered.

ronsport of Explosives
To understand the tran sport of
explos ives, a few things must be clear.
First, ex pl osives a re class ified as
d angerous goo ds . T h e dangerous
goods covered by th e heading of a
cl ass are defined o n the basis of their
properties. The assignment of Class 1
exp los ive subs tances and a rt icles ha s
been ass ign ed ro a division and a
compatibility grou p. The division is
based on the results of the tests described
in UN regulations. Listed below are the
various divisions and compatibi lity
groups into which Class 1 ex plosive
substances and articles are subdivid ed.

Definition of Compatibility Croup

Gro~

Aniclc containing a ptimary c:~.plos i 1 ·c subsl<lncc and not having two or more
ciTccti vc protccti 1·c features. Some articles, such a~ detonators for blasting,
detonator assemblies rur blasting and cap· I~ pc primers, are included. even
thou<>h they do not contain primary cxplosi1·cs.
Sccondar} dctonatmg c),.plosi1 c s ubstance or black powder or article
D
contai ning a secondary detonating explosi1·e s ubstance. In each case, without
means or initiation and without a propell ing charge, or an article contmning a
primary c-..plosi,·c substance and ha1·ing tll'o or more crrcctivc protccti 1·c
features.
-Substance or article so packed or designed that any hanrdous cffccto; arisi ng
s
from acctdcntal functioning arc confined wi thin the package unless the
package has been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or projection effects
are htmted to the c.\tenttha t they do not significantly htnder or prc1·cnt fire·
fighting o r other emergency response efforts in the immediate 1·icinity of the
package.
Table 1: Classification of compatibi lity groups.
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Class 1: Explosive Substances
and Articles
Division numbers give information
on how the explosives can be transported.
Explosives typical for dem ining can be
pur into one of the following divisions:
• Division 1.1: Substan ces and
articles that have a mass explosion hazard
(a mass explosion is an explosion that
affects almost the entire load instantaneo usly) .
• Division 1.4: Substances and
arti cles that present only a slight risk
of explosion in the event of ignition or
initiation during carriage. The effects are
largely confined to the package and no
projection of fragments of appreciable
size or range is to be expected. An external
fire shall not cause an instantaneous
explo sion of the entire co nte nt s of
the package.

Compatibility Groups
Compatibility groups inform you
about how to stuff a container and how
it can be transported as well. Definitions
of co mpatibility groups of substances
and articles for demining are listed in
Table l to the top right.
When stuffin g a container with
explosives, you are allowed ro have normal
goods in the container as well, bur under
no circumstances can it contain other
dangerous goods. Table 2 shows what is
possible ro mix when stuffing a container.
By putting di vision number and
co mpatibi li ty g roup together, it is
possible to stow and transport the
explosives by sea or air in accordance wi rh
International Maritime Organizatio n
(IMO) regulations (transporting by ship)
or in accordance with the International
Air Tra n sport Association (lATA)
dangerous goods regulation (transporting
by air) as in Table 3.
Table 3 is rather theoretically and can
be difficult to understand. All explosives
will be listed as Class 1. In addition, they
will have a division number, a compatibility number, a UN number and a
proper shipping name. Typical explosives
fo r demining can be as Table 4 depicts.

